Flexibility in the Stability and Growth Pact – investment clause

3 February 2015
E-001763-15
Question for written answer
to the Commission
Rule 130
Elisa Ferreira (S&D) , Francisco Assis (S&D) , Hugues Bayet (S&D) , Udo Bullmann (S&D) , Nessa Childers (S&D) , Jonás Fernández (S&D) , Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D) , Ana Gomes (S&D) , Roberto Gualtieri (S&D) , Costas Mavrides (S&D) , Alessia Maria Mosca (S&D) , Liliana Rodrigues (S&D) , Maria João Rodrigues (S&D) , Alfred Sant (S&D) , Ricardo Serrão Santos (S&D) , Pedro Silva Pereira (S&D) , Renato Soru (S&D) , Tibor Szanyi (S&D) , Carlos Zorrinho (S&D)

Subject: Flexibility in the Stability and Growth Pact — investment clause

Question(s)

The ‘investment clause’ featured in the Commission communication entitled ‘Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact’ (COM(2015) 0012) corresponds to an extensive interpretation of Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)), taking into account ‘some investments deemed to be equivalent to major structural reforms’.

In connection with Article 5 of the preventive arm and Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (the corrective arm), the structural reforms highlighted in Article 5 of the preventive arm should henceforth be regarded as ‘relevant factors’ in the corrective arm.

However, ‘investments deemed to be equivalent to major structural reforms’ do not receive the same treatment.

This asymmetry prevents the application of the ‘investment clause’ for countries under the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP).

1. What inhibits the Commission from — using the same methodology — extending the ‘investment clause’ to the corrective arm of the SGP, thus extending all the benefits of the European Fund for Strategic Investments, structural and cohesion policy, the trans‐European networks and the Connecting Europe Facility to the poorest countries in the Union (many of which are under the EDP), given that convergence is also a target covered by the legislation (Article 5 of the preventive arm and Article 17a of the corrective arm)?

2. From the perspective of convergence, should not ‘investments deemed to be equivalent to structural reforms’ also be considered to be ‘relevant factors’ in line with Article 2 of the corrective arm?

Answer given by Mr Moscovici on behalf of the Commission
(28.4.2015)

The so called “investment clause” and “structural clause” apply only to the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – they are contained in Article 5 of Regulation 1466/97. No such clauses exist in the corrective arm of the SGP – Regulation 1467/97.

Regarding structural reforms under the corrective arm, the Commission’s Communication on making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the SGP recalls that the implementation of structural reforms is among the so called relevant factors to be considered when examining whether to open the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and when establishing or extending a deadline for correction of the excessive deficit. The Communication reiterates thus the relevant factors approach that is grounded in the Treaty and Regulation 1467/97.

Regarding investment under the corrective arm, the Communication also states that national contributions to the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) will be treated as a relevant factor when examining whether to open an EDP. In addition, in as much as such contributions are one-offs, they will also not be taken into account in defining the fiscal adjustment required.

Therefore, while the use of Article 5 of Regulation 1466/97 cannot be extended to the corrective arm, the Commission is utilising the flexibility within the existing rules of the SGP to support both investment and implementation of structural reforms.

Maltese Version

E-001763/2015
Suġġett: Flessibbiltà fil-Patt ta’ Stabbiltà u Tkabbir — klawżola dwar l-investiment

Il-“klawżola dwar l-investiment” li tidher fil-komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni bit-titolu “Nagħmlu l-aħjar użu mill-flessibbiltà fi ħdan ir-regoli eżistenti tal-Patt ta” Stabbiltà u Tkabbir’ (COM(2015)0012), tikkorrispondi għal interpretazzjoni estensiva tal-Artikolu 5 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1466/97 (il-parti preventiva tal-Patt ta’ Stabbiltà u Tkabbir (PST)), filwaqt li tqis “xi investimenti meqjusa ekwivalenti għal riformi strutturali prinċipali”.
B’rabta mal-Artikolu 5 tal-parti preventiva u l-Artikolu 2 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1467/97 (il-parti korrettiva), ir-riformi strutturali enfasizzati fl-Artikolu 5 tal-parti preventiva għandhom jiġu kkunsidrati minn issa “l quddiem bħala ‘fatturi rilevanti’ fil-parti korrettiva.
Madankollu, l-investimenti ‘meqjusa ekwivalenti għal riformi strutturali prinċipali’ ma jirċevux l-istess trattament.
Dan in-nuqqas ta” simmetrija jimpedixxi l-applikazzjoni tal-“klawżola dwar l-investiment” għall-pajjiżi mqiegħda fil-Proċedura ta’ Defiċit Eċċessiv (PDE).
1. X’iżomm lill-Kummissjoni milli, bl-użu tal-istess metodoloġija, testendi l-“klawżola dwar l-investiment” għall-parti korrettiva tal-PST, biex b’hekk testendi l-benefiċċji kollha tal-Fond Ewropew għal Investimenti Strateġiċi, tal-politika strutturali u ta’ koeżjoni, tan-netwerks trans-Ewropej u tal-Faċilità Nikkollegaw l-Ewropa, fl-ifqar pajjiżi tal-Unjoni (li ħafna minnhom qegħdin fil-PDE), ladarba l-konverġenza hija wkoll għan kopert mil-leġiżlazzjoni (l-Artikolu 5 tal-parti preventiva u l-Artikolu 17a tal-parti korrettiva)?
2. Mill-perspettiva ta’ konverġenza, l-investimenti “meqjusa ekwivalenti għal riformi strutturali” m’għandhomx jitqiesu wkoll li huma “fatturi rilevanti” f’konformità mal-Artikolu 2 tal-parti korrettiva?

Tweġiba mogħtija mis-Sur Moscovici f’isem il-Kummissjoni
(28.4.201 5)

L-hekk imsejħa “klawsola ta’ investiment” u “klawżola strutturali” japplikaw biss għall-parti preventiva tal-Patt ta’ Stabbiltà u Tkabbir (PST) – huma inklużi fl-Artikolu 5 tar-Regolament 1466/97. Ebda klawsoli tali ma teżisti fil-parti korrettiva tal-PST – ir-Regolament 1467/97.

Rigward ir-riformi strutturali taħt il-parti korrettiva, il-Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar l-aħjar użu tal-flessibbiltà fi ħdan ir-regoli eżistenti tal-PST tfakkar li l-implimentazzjoni tar-riformi strutturali huma fost l-hekk imsejħa fatturi rilevanti li għandhom jiġu kkunsidrati meta tiġi eżaminata jekk tinfetaħx il-Proċedura ta’ Defiċit Eċċessiv (PDE) u meta tiġi stabbilita jew estiża l-iskadenza għall-korrezzjoni tad-defiċit eċċessiv. Il-Komunikazzjoni ttenni għalhekk l-approċċ rigward il-fatturi rilevanti li huwa bbażat fuq it-Trattat u r-Regolament 1467/97.

Fir-rigward ta’ investiment taħt il-parti korrettiva, il-Komunikazzjoni tiddikjara wkoll li l-kontribuzzjonijiet nazzjonali għall-Fond Ewropew għal Investimenti Strateġiċi (FEIS) se jiġu ttrattati bħala fattur rilevanti meta jiġi eżaminat jekk tinbediex PDE. Barra minn hekk, sa fejn dawn il-kontribuzzjonijiet huma ta’ darba biss, dawn ukoll mhux se jiġu kkunsidrati fid-definizzjoni tal-aġġustament fiskali meħtieġ.

Għalhekk, filwaqt li l-użu tal-Artikolu 5 tar-Regolament Nru 1466/97 ma jistax jiġi estiż għall-parti korrettiva, il-Kummissjoni qed tuża l-flessibbiltà fi ħdan ir-regoli eżistenti tal-PST biex tappoġġa kemm l-investiment u l-implimentazzjoni tar-riformi strutturali.