Sant: L-inċentivi pprovduti mill-awtoritajiet nazzjonali lill-banek li jkunu fallew finanzjarjament jistgħu jwasslu għal użu anqas favorevoli tal-fondi pubbliċi

Waqt skambju ta’ fehmiet dwar is-sitwazzjoni bankarja fl-Ewropa, fil-Kumitat għall-Affarijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji (ECON) tal-Parlament Ewropew, l-eks Prim Ministru Alfred Sant innota kif il-banek inġenerali, biex jitħallew imexxu n-negozju tagħhom, ikollhom josservaw ir-rekwiżiti minimi għall-fondi proprji u l-obbligazzjonijiet finanzjarji mitqiesa bħala ta’ kwalità tajba, li jkollhom iżommu għal-lest (MREL). Min-naħa l-oħra, huwa sostna li numru sostanzjali ta’ banek żgħar qed jirrappurtaw li jkollhom problemi meta jiġu biex jagħmlu użu minn titoli finanzjarji li huma mitqiesa ta’ kwalità tajba u li jgħoddu biex jissodisfaw l-esiġenzi tal-MREL.

L-iskambju ta’ fehmiet tal-ECON sar ma’ Dominique Laboureix, President tal-Bord Uniku ta’ Riżoluzzjoni (SRB). Dan il-Bord hu nkarigat biex skont il-każ, jew jgħin biex bank li jinsab f’diffikultajiet kbar jerġa’ jiġi f’siktu jew addirittura jxoljieh. Minkejja l-proċess ta’ konsolidament bankarju fl-Ewropa matul l-aħħar għaxar snin, bħalissa hemm madwar 2,400 bank żgħir u ta’ daqs medju fl-Unjoni. Dawn il-banek jistgħu jkunu aktar vulnerabbli minn banek kbar u fil-każ ta’ falliment jistgħu anke jkunu ta’ riskju għall-istabbiltà finanzjarja ġenerali.

L-Ewroparlamentari Laburista Alfred Sant sostna li l-aktar strateġija komuni għal banek kbar hija waħda li fiha l-kredituri ta’ istituzzjoni finanzjarja li qed ifallu jikkanċellaw wħud mis-self tagħhom bħala parti minn pjan biex isalvaw il-bank mill-kollass finanzjarju. Min-naħa l-oħra, il-biċċa l-kbira tal-banek li huma iżgħar jippreferu strateġija li biha l-bank jinbiegħ kollu kemm hu, jew f’partijiet minnu. Huwa saħaq li t-tali differenzi fl-approċċi tista’ twassal għal deċiżjonijiet żbaljati bejn il-banek żgħar u dawk kbar. Dan jwassal għal sitwazzjoni fejn l-awtoritajiet nazzjonali jispiċċaw jipprovdu inċentivi ħalli l-problemi ta’ banek f’riskju li jfallu jinħallu b’użu żbaljat ta’ fondi pubbliċi.

Laboureix wieġeb li jqis il-fondi li issa jinsabu għad-dispożizzjoni tal-bord biex ikun jista’ jkopri t-telf li jkun irid jiġi kopert huma biżżejjed. Li jrid isir hu li d-differenzi fl-istrateġiji użati lejn banek kbar u dawk żgħar ma jwasslux biex jinħolqu differenzi fis-swieq finanzjarji li jkunu diskiminatorji. Xorta l-aktar għan important jibqa’ li s-servizzi kritiċi li jipprovdu l-banek jiġu mħarsa, u dan ma japplikax għall-approwċ li bih il-kredituri jkollhom jikkanċellaw parti mis-somom li jkollhom fil-banek konċernati.

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Sant: Incentives provided by national authorities to failed banks could lead to unfavourable terms of use of public funds

During an exchange of views on the banking situation in Europe, at the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON), former Prime Minister Alfred Sant noted that overall banks do comply with the minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL). On the other hand, he claimed that a significant number of small banks report difficulties to deploy financial instruments that are relevant for the purpose of meeting MREL requirements. 

The ECON exchange of views was with Dominique Laboureix, Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB). Notwithstanding the consolidation process in Europe over the last decade, currently there are about 2,400 small and medium-sized banks in the Union. These banks can be more vulnerable than their bigger counterparts and in the event of failure could pose a risk to overall financial stability.

Labour MEP Alfred Sant argued that while the most common strategy for larger banks would be a bail-in resolution strategy, most smaller banks prefer a transfer strategy whereby the whole bank is sold or transferred in parts to an acquirer. He stressed that such a divergence in approaches could contribute to a misalignment between small and big banks. This would result in national authorities providing incentives to deal with failing or likely to fail banks through solutions that are not optimal in terms of use of public funds. He noted that this scenario fortunately has not been tested yet but warned that geopolitical instabilities and the COVID crisis taught us that we are never completely sheltered from the next crisis.

Laboureix replied that instruments that are usable for the ‘absorption of own funds’ ensure that there are sufficient amounts for absorption capacity. The Chair of the SRB stated that there are differences in strategies that do not create an uneven level-playing field. The key is to preserve critical functions, and this does not apply to the bail-in, Laboureix said.